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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lonnie Johnson has challenged, on appeal, the sufficiency of the State's
evidence to sustain a conviction for grand theft, the jury instructions in this case, the
district court's exclusion of a material defense witness, the prosecutorial misconduct
that was committed during closing arguments, and the restitution order entered in this
case by the district court.
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, under the pertinent standards of law
and the evidence in this case, Mr. Johnson's judgment of conviction and sentence
should be vacated by this Court. Specifically, under applicable United States Supreme
Court case law, the State was required to prove, and the jury was required to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no market value for the copper wire that
Mr. Johnson was alleged to have stolen and that the replacement value posited by the
State was for wire of similar quality, design, and value of that alleged to have been
stolen in order to use the replacement value of the wire in order to sustain a conviction
for grand theft.
Moreover, the record demonstrates that the defense witness excluded by the
district court would have presented evidence relevant to Mr. Johnson's defense. In
particular, this witness would have corroborated Mr. Johnson's account of the source of
some of the copper wire that he had sold to Pacific Steel and Recycling came from his
brother's property and further explained why someone else's name appeared on one of
the receipts from Mr. Johnson's sale of copper wire to this facility. As such, the State's

argument that the exclusion of this witness was proper as a discovery sanction is not
supported by case law or the record in this case.
This Reply Brief is also necessary to clarify that, under pertinent legal standards
with regard to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, appeals to the passions and
prejudice of the jury are improper, and do not become less so due to the efforts of
defense counsel to ameliorate the effect of a prosecutor's improper argument.
While Mr. Johnson continues to assert that the cumulative errors that occurred in
his case entitled him to a new trial, and that the district court erred in its award of
restitution in this case, he will rely on the arguments presented in his Appellant's Brief
and does not reiterate these arguments herein.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Johnson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1

Was there insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilt on the charge
of grand theft?

2.

Did the district court err in failing to properly instruct the jury that the State bore
the burden of proof to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the market
value of the wire was not ascertainable and that the replacement cost proffered
by the State was for wire of similar quality, design, and value as that alleged to
have been stolen, in order for the jury to use the proffered replacement value as
the measure of value for purposes of establishing the grade of Mr. Johnson's
offense?

3.

Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Johnson's constitutional right to present
an adequate defense and to compulsory process, when the district court
excluded an exculpatory defense witness as a discovery sanction?

4.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error
when she referred to Mr. Johnson as a "scavenger" and a "buzzard," and when
she mischaracterized the substance of Mr. Johnson's testimony during closing
arguments?

ARGUMENT
I.
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Jurv's Verdict Of Guilt On The Charae
Of Grand Theft
The State has erroneously asserted that it presented substantial, competent
evidence that would support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
ascertainable market value for the copper wire that Mr. Johnson was alleged to have
stolen and that the replacement cost proffered was for wire of similar quality, design,
and value as the wire alleged to have been stolen. However, a review of the pertinent
case law - including those cases proffered by the State in support of its contention along with the record in this case demonstrates that the State's assertion is without
merit.
The State attempts to rely on cases from various jurisdictions in support of its
contention that there was substantial, competent evidence from which the jury could
have found that replacement value was the appropriate measure in order to determine
whether

Mr. Johnson was guilty of grand theft, as opposed to petit theft. (Respondent's

Brief, pp.22-29.) However, a review of these cases demonstrates that they were either
based upon specific testimony or underlying allegations that are not present in this
case, or provide no indication as to whether the decision is rooted in a similar statutory
scheme as that employed in Idaho in order to measure the gradation of a theft offense.
Because a review of the sufficiency of the State's evidence is, by definition, limited to
the evidence actually presented in the underlying proceedings on appeal, these cases
are not helpful to this Court in its determinations in this appeal.

In State v. cope1, one of the cases primarily relied upon by the State, the
defendants were alleged to have stolen copper wire that was encased within a
transformer. Cope, 438 P.2d. at 443-444. (See also Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23.)
Because the defendants broke into and stripped the contents of the transformer in
which copper wires were contained, thereby destroying the value of the transformer as
a separate item of property in which the wires were component parts, the court in Cope
found that the market value for the transformer was an appropriate measure of value for
purposes of determining the grade of the defendant's theft offense. Id. at 444.
,
case relied on by the State issued from
Similarly, in State v. ~ l b e r f another
Oregon in 1926, the defendant was charged with theft of equipment from a "milk
condensery." Albert, 242 P. at 1117. (See Respondent's Brief, p.23.) Upon taking the
equipment, the defendant in Albert was alleged to have destroyed the equipment by
breaking it into pieces and selling the iron pieces for scrap. Id. at 1117-1118.
There are several reasons why the opinions in Cope and Albert do not provide
persuasive guidance to this Court. First, the State has presented no legal authority as
to whether the State of Arizona in 1968 or the State of Oregon in 1926 defined the
valuation element of those states' grand theft statutes in a manner that is similar to that
of Idaho's current grand theft statute. As previously noted in the Appellant's Brief, the
use of replacement value in Idaho is limited by statute and pertinent case law to only
those circumstances where: (1) there is no ascertainable market value; and (2) the
replacement value proffered is for goods of similar quality, design, and value as that
alleged to have been stolen. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21.) Because the State has

' State

V.

Cope, 438 P.2d 442 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).

provided no means by which this Court can determine whether the Cope or the Alberts
opinion is based upon a similar statutory scheme, there is no reason to believe that
these opinions represent an interpretation of law that has any relevance to the Idaho
statutes at issue in this case.
More important, however, is that there has been no evidence presented in this
case that Mr. Johnson destroyed any item in which the wire was encased as a
component part or destroyed a separate piece of property - he was only alleged to have
taken the wire itself. In fact, the evidence in this case demonstrates that the wire at
issue was not contained within any particular structure at all. (Tr., p.123, Ls.11-23.)
Additionally, the testimony presented at trial further showed that an undisclosed portion
of this wire was non-functional at all, but was merely "inactive" wire that was never
replaced after it was cut down. (Tr., p.172, L.4 - p.173, L.lO.) Given this, the holding in
Cope is inapposite to this case, as the evidence presented in Mr. Johnson's trial was in
no way similar to the pertinent aspects of the evidence presented in Mr. Cope's trial in
1968.
The State presents additional case law from other states that is inapposite to the
testimony presented in Mr. Johnson's trial.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.26-28.)

For

example, in Beasley v. Commonwealth, there was no evidence that the wire the
defendant was alleged to have taken "had deteriorated in any way," and there was
testimony presented by the state to the jury that there was "practically no market value"
for the wire in the form in which it was originally taken. Beasley v. Commonwealth, 339
S.W.2d 179, 181 (Ky. 1960). Correspondingly, the decision in Sfate

* State v. Albert, 242 P. 1116 (Or. 1926).
6

v. Helms also

involved express testimony that the item alleged to have been stolen was not commonly
bought and sold and, therefore, did not have an ascertainable market value. State

v.

Helms, 418 S.E.2d 832, 833 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
Here, in contrast, there was evidence that the copper wire had substantially
deteriorated from the quality and value of the new wire used to measure replacement
value; and further there was no testimony presented that there was no market value for
the wire alleged to have been taken.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction must be measured by the
testimony that was actually presented to the jury at trial. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 144
ldaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007) (issue in a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction is whether the jury was presented with substantial,
competent evidence at trial to support the conviction). The evidence in this case cannot
be deemed sufficient by this Court based upon the testimony presented in a different
trial in Kentucky in 1960 or in North Carolina in 1992. Given the marked differences in
the evidence presented in this case from the evidence presented in the cases relied
upon by the State, the State's reliance on Beasley and Helms is misplaced.
Similarly, the other cases cited by the State in support of its position are
inapposite, either because they involve a different evidentiary standard of review,
involve underlying allegations of the theft of fundamentally different types of property,
are based upon testimony not presented in this case, or because there is no indication
that these cases were decided under a similar statutory scheme as that contained within
the pertinent ldaho statutes. See I.C. §§ 18-2402(11)(a), 18-2407(b)(l); McClure

v.

State, 673 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (deciding an issue of the measure of

damages under a preponderance of the evidence standard, with no indication of
whether Georgia statutes apply a similar standard for use of replacement value); State
v. Helms, 413 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding use of replacement cost for pay

telephone appropriate when testimony was presented at trial that pay telephones were
not commonly bought and sold; therefore, there was no ascertainable market value);
State

V.

Landlee, 513 P.2d 186 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (jury was entitled to credit market

valuation of the copper wire alleged to have been stolen, even though the testimony
was asserted to have been internally inconsistent). And, in McClure, unlike here, the
testimony as to the measure of market value was based upon the actual copper wire
itself at the time and place of the taking. McClure, 673 So.2d at 466-467. In this case,
the testimony as to replacement value was for wire that was not of the same quality,
design, and type of the wire that was alleged to have been taken. The testimony as to
the purported replacement value was for new wire, but the wire alleged to have been
taken was up to 100 years old, coated with patina, and covered in tar and fibers. (Tr.,
p.235, Ls.1-16.)
The State further misstates Mr. Johnson's argument as a claim that market value
for copper wire "is limited to scrap value." (Respondent's Brief, p.26.) Mr. Johnson's
actual assertion is that, under the definition of market value as "the price at which the
owner would hold those goods out to sale to the general public," the evidence in this
case demonstrated that there was a market value for the wire, either as calculated by
the price that Pacific Steel and Recycling paid for the wire alleged to have been stolen
or by the alternate market value of the price that Pacific Steel and Recycling obtained in
selling the copper to other businesses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-23; Tr., p.189, Ls.1-

10.) Because the State in this case never presented evidence at trial that these did not
constitute a proper "market value," there was no evidence from which a jury could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the market value could not be ascertained
The proof of value as the measure of the gradation of a theft offense must fairly
represent the value of what was actually alleged to have been taken under Idaho's
statutory scheme. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to justify the State's
departure from the market values established at trial in favor of the use of replacement
cost; and there was insufficient evidence that the replacement cost posited actually bore
a reasonable relationship to the quality, design, and value of the actual wire alleged to
have been taken. in light of this, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict of guilt of grand theft in this case.
II,

The District Court Erred In Failing To Properlv Instruct The Jurv That The State Bore
The Burden Of Proof To Establish, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt. That The Market
Value Of The Wire Was Not Ascertainable And That The Replacement Cost Proffered
By The State Was For Wire Of Similar Quality, Design, And Value As That Alleged To
Have Been Stolen, In Order For The Jurv To Use The Proffered Replacement Value As
The Measure Of Value For Purposes Of Establishing The Grade Of Mr. Johnson's
Offense
In response to Mr. Johnson's claim on appeal that the district court's jury
instructions impermissibly relieved the State of its burden of proof, the State has
erroneously asserted that the State's burden of proof did not extend to the method of
valuation because this fact "is not an essential element of the offense." (Respondent's
Brief, p.11.) The State's argument ignores the clear mandate set forth by the United
as well as the subsequent holdings in Apprendi
States Supreme Court in Jones v. u.s.~,

Jones v. U.S.,526 U.S. 227 (1999)

v. New ,Jersey4 and Blakely v. washingfon5 that further articulated the principles
originally set forth in Jones with regard to the State's burden of proof as to facts which
increase the maximum punishment that a defendant may face upon a conviction.
From the outset, the State has characterized Mr. Johnson's claim as a mere
complaint that the jury instructions "could have been more detailed." (Respondent's
Brief, p.8.) This characterization fundamentally misses the mark with regard to the
issue in this appeal. Mr. Johnson's actual assertion is that, because the manner of
valuation was a factual finding that the jury was required to make in order to determine
whether Mr. Johnson was guilty of a felony or a misdemeanor, United States Supreme
Court case law mandates that the jury must make this finding beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because the district court's instruction relieved the State of its burden of proof,
Mr. Johnson's constitutional rights to due process and to a jury determination as to guilt
were violated. (Appellant's Brief, pp.29-34.)
The State's primary argument with regard to the propriety of the jury instructions
in this case is that the manner of valuation is not an essential element of grand theft
and, therefore, the district court correctly told the jury that the State was not required to
prove the requisite findings of fact beyond a reasonable in order to use replacement
cost for purposes of determining value. However, this claim flies in the face of the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Jones, and the subsequent cases of Apprendi and Blakely
and, therefore, is without merit.
The Jones Court made clear that, when a statutory scheme permits the
imposition of "steeply higher penalties" that are conditioned on the findings of fact, those
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

further facts become as important as the essential elements of the offense. Jones, 526
U.S. at 232-233.

Because of this, "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment and the notice and jury guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
243 n.6.

Therefore, the Jones Court ultimately concluded that the State bore the

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the factual finding of whether serious
bodily injury resulted from the charged offense of car-jacking, despite the fact that the
courts had not previously treated this finding as an essential element of the offense. Id.
at 251-252.
This holding was later re-affirmed and elaborated on in Apprendi, which dealt
with a sentencing enhancement based upon a finding that the underlying offense was a
hate crime (i.e. that the crime was committed "with a biased purpose"). Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 470. The Apprendi Court reiterated the Jones holding, and further adopted the
position of Justice Stevens' concurrence in Jones that:
[Ijt is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts
must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 490 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 232-233.)

The Court again re-affirmed this principle in Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-314. The
unifying holding running through these three cases is straight-forward - it makes no
difference what label is attached to a factual finding for purposes of whether the State
must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. For purposes of pleading and proof,
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater maximum penalty for the offense must
be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.
Two factual findings were required in order for the jury to use replacement value
to elevate the grade of Mr. Johnson's offense: that market value could not be
ascertained and that the replacement value was for property of similar quality, design,
and value as that alleged to have been stolen.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.29-34.)

Because these factual findings elevated of the grade of Mr. Johnson's charged offense,
thereby exposing Mr. Johnson to a greater maximum penalty for this offense, the State
was required to prove these findings beyond a reasonable doubt. The State's argument
to the contrary is in error.6
Finally, the State asserts that the ldaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v.
Hughes7 "suggests" that the State may not have the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as to the predicate factual findings required prior to use of
replacement value in measuring the grade of a theft offense. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.13-15.) This argument focuses on the Hughes Court's use of the phrases, "some
evidence," and, "a showing," to describe the State's burden to proffer proof that fair
market value cannot be ascertained.
The State's reliance on Hughes is misplaced for two reasons. First, the Hughes
opinion was not called upon, and does not purport, to resolve the issue of what standard

It is worth noting that the Montana Supreme Court case of State v. Ohms holds as
much, despite the State's assertion that the Ohms opinion does not do so. (See
Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.) In Ohms, the court held that "no rational finder of fact
could have found the essential elements of felony theft, as defined by statute, beyond a
reasonable doubt" because the state "failed to establish that the market value could not
be satisfactorily ascertained." State v. Ohms, 46 P.3d 55, 58 (Mont. 2002).
' State v. Hughes, 130 ldaho 698,946 P.2d 1338 (Ct. App. 1997).

of proof applies to the requisite showing by the State. Hughes, 130 Idaho at 703-704,
946 P.2d at 1343-1344. But the second, and more cogent, reason why the State's
reliance is misplaced is that the Hughes opinion was rendered in 1997, prior to the
United States Supreme Court's holdings in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely. To the extent
that the Hughes opinion may "suggest" that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not
required, the subsequent clarifications provided by the U.S. Supreme Court dictate that
this suggestion is erroneous.
The State also argues that, even if it bore the burden to establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that market value of the wire was not ascertainable prior to using
replacement value to establish the grade of Mr. Johnson's offense, the jury instructions
adequately communicated this burden. However, the State's argument ignores that the
disputed instruction given affirmatively informed the jury that the State did not have to
prove any fact beyond a reasonable doubt unless the district court told them that this
burden of proof applied. (Appellant's Brief, pp.31-32.) Because the district court never
informed the jury that the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
market value for the copper wire could not be ascertained prior to relying on
replacement value, the jury instructions in this case relieved the State of its burden of
proof.
The State has further mischaracterized the proper analysis for whether the jury
instructional error in this case was harmless error. The State has claimed that, "this
court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt that even if the jury had been instructed
as Johnson claims they should have been, the jury would have found Johnson guilty of
grand theft." (Respondent's Brief, p.19.) However, this is not the proper formulation of

the pertinent constitutional harmless error test as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). The proper test, taken from the Neder
opinion itself, is "whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a
contrary finding with respect to the omitted element." Id. at 19. As further articulated by
the Neder Court:
If, at the end of that examination, the court cannot conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent
the error - for example, where the defendant contested the omitted
element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding - it
should not find the error harmless.

As has been previously noted, the issue of whether there existed a market value
and the appropriate measure of that market value was contested throughout the
proceedings, and the evidence demonstrated two potential sources that could easily
have been found to be the market value by a rational fact-finder - the price actually paid
for the wire by the recycling center and the resale value of the copper upon being
processed and sold by the recycling center. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.33-34.) Under
the applicable standard for harmless error, the State has not established that this error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The District Court Erred. And Violated Mr. Johnson's Constitutional Riqht To Present An
Adequate Defense And To Compulsory Process, When The District Court Excluded An
Exculpatory Defense Witness As A Discovery Sanction
In response to Mr. Johnson's argument on appeal that the district court erred
when it excluded a defense witness, James Aterburn, as a discovery sanction, the State
asserts that the exclusion of this evidence was not error because Mr. Aterburn's

testimony was not relevant. The State's assertion that Mr. Johnson did not demonstrate
that the testimony that could have been provided by Mr. Aterburn was relevant is belied
by the State's own acknowledgement that this witness was offered to "corroborate
certain aspects of Johnson's testimony." (Respondent's Brief, p.38.)
Multiple cases discussing the improper exclusion of a defense witness as a
discovery sanction have recognized that the ability of the witness to corroborate the
defendant's version of events makes such testimony relevant.

See, e.g., State v.

Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847-848, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205-1206 (1999); State v. Lamphere,
130 ldaho 630, 633, 945 P.2d 1, 4 (1997).

As pointed out by defense counsel,

Mr. Aterburn could provide testimony to corroborate that the actual source for two of the
three sales of copper wire was Mr. Johnson's brother's backyard - and not the poles
along the railroad. (Tr., 254, Ls.7-9; p.262, L.8 - p.263, L.24.) According to the offer of
proof made by defense counsel, Mr. Aterburn could testify that he had personally
observed that wire in Mr. Johnson's brother's backyard. (Tr., p.254, Ls.10-17.)
In addition to having relevance as corroboration of material aspects of
Mr. Johnson's testimony, this witness also could have provided an explanation for the
presence of Mr. Aterburn's brother's name on a receipt for the sale of wire - which was
a fact that the prosecutor sought to use to imply criminal intent or an attempt on the part
of Mr. Johnson to conceal his identity. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9; p.322, L.3 - p.333, L.6.)
Given that the State sought to place a sinister spin on the fact that one of the receipts
reflected Mr. Aterburn's brother's name, rather than Mr. Johnson's, an objective and
innocent explanation for this fact was entirely relevant to counter the implication of
consciousness of guilt made by the State.

Because this evidence had relevance, the State's reliance on State v.

horna as^ is

misplaced. In Thomas, "the defense presented no offer of proof or description of the
proposed testimony that would indicate its relevance." Id. at 803, 992 P.2d at 798. The
lack of any relevance of the testimony was the basis for the Thomas opinion. Beyond
this, defense counsel in Thomas had expressly represented to the prosecutor that the
witness at issue would not be called, which was a representation upon which the
prosecutor had relied in determining which witnesses to call at trial. Id. at 802, 992 P.2d
at 797. There were no such affirmative misrepresentations made by defense counsel in
this case. As such, the Court's holding in Thomas is not instructive for this Court.
IV.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Risins To The Level Of A Fundamental Error
When She Referred To Mr. Johnson As A "Scavenser" And A "Buzzard," And When
She Mischaracterized The Substance Of Mr. Johnson's Testimonv During Closing
Arguments
The State makes several responses to Mr. Johnson's assertions of prosecutorial
misconduct on appeal.

With regard to Mr. Johnson's claim that the prosecutor

committed misconduct, and improperly appealed to the passions and prejudice of the
jury, by depicting the railroad as a particularly vulnerable victim and thereby improper
appealing to sympathy, the State asserts that the prosecutor's remarks were simply
remarks "which concern matters of general knowledge and experience." (Respondent's
Brief, pp.47-48.) However, the State's argument ignores that the prosecutor's argument
regarding the vulnerability of the railroad industry were linked directly to her remarks
that Mr. Johnson was a "scavenger" and a "buzzard" who was "picking off the bones of

Sfate v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 800, 992 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1999).

the railroad industry." (Tr., p.330, L.25 - p.331, L.8.) Thus, this statement was clearly
intended to arouse the emotions of the jury in order to sway their view of the case,
rather than being a mere recitation of facts within "general knowledge and experience."
The State also attempts to minimize the prejudicial impact of the prosecutor's
reference to Mr. Johnson as a "buzzard" and a "scavenger." According to the State,
these remarks were merely a metaphor for Mr. Johnson's behavior. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.49-50.) However, this is not an accurate characterization of the connotation of
these terms.

In particular, the term "buzzard" carries with it a quite negative

connotation, and one of its common meanings is "a contemptible or rapacious person."
Merriam-Webster

Online

Dictionary

(visited

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionaryhmard).

on

December

20,

2009),

When viewed in context of the

interconnected statements seeking to gain the jury's sympathy for the vulnerable state
of the railroad industry, these remarks were clearly intended to induce the jury to
consider factors outside the evidence and to decide this case on an emotional, rather
than an evidentiary, basis.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment of
conviction and sentence and remand his case for entry of a judgment of conviction for
misdemeanor theft. In the alternative, he asks that this Court reverse his judgment of
conviction and sentence, and further reverse the district court's order of restitution, and
remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 3lStdayof December, 2009.
A

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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